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III. COMMUNIST FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF U.S. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

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The intelligence community has very little hard evidence to support the thesis that foreign Communists are providing financial support to American revolutionary organizations. In fact, there is a scarcity of information about the entire question of where these organizations get the money to finance their activities.

The community believes that they are able to finance their activities from contributions, dues, sales of literature, benefits, and advertisements. There is good reason, in my opinion, to believe that this is true in the case of SDS. I am less convinced that it is true of other revolutionary organizations.

There is some evidence to indicate that the Progressive Labor Party (PL), is receiving financial support from Communist China and perhaps from Cuba. And there is also good reason to believe that the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) has at least on occasion received financial support from Cuba. The sources of Black Panther funds are largely unknown, although there is some evidence suggesting that the organization has resorted to extortion and bank robberies to finance its activities.

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has contributed funds to any New Left or Black Power organization.

I have been able to ascertain only two cases where the intelligence community has "hard evidence" of foreign financial support of revolutionary organizations in this country.

(1) During 1967 and 1968, the Progressive Labor Party received a total of more than \$13,000 from a European Bank where an organ of the Chinese Communist Government maintains an account. During 1968, the PLP received more than \$2,000 from Hong Kong.

(2) James Forman, International Director of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, was informed on December 27, 1967, that the Cuban United Nations Mission was holding money for his organization and arrangements were made on that date for him to visit a Cuban intelligence agent. On January 18, 1968, Forman and an unidentified Negro were observed entering the Mission empty-handed. A few minutes later each departed the Mission carrying a package wrapped in plain brown paper.

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On June 24, I met with Phillip Abbott Luce, a former high-ranking member of the Progressive Labor Party. In 1963 and 1964, he helped organize PLP-sponsored student tours to Cuba in violation of the then-existing State Department ban on travel to that country.

Luce told me that he personally arranged for money to be picked up from the Cuban Mission to the United Nations to finance the tour in the summer of 1963. He also indicated that when the PL students returned from Cuba in 1963 and again in 1964, the Cubans gave them a substantial amount of money to bring back into the country. As he recalls, the amount was \$10,000 in each instance.

I am generally satisfied that the intelligence community does not have any hard evidence confirming substantial foreign financial support of the revolutionary protest movement. However, I believe that it is quite likely that more foreign funding has occurred than the intelligence community is aware of. Luce's conversation confirms this in my opinion (it is interesting that no member of the intelligence community reported to me the substance of Luce's revelations, although he was debriefed by the Bureau when he left the PIP in 1965.)

The absence of hard evidence is due, I believe, to two factors. First, the political sensitivity of surveillance of domestic political organizations is so great the intelligence community has been reluctant to conduct a vigorous collection effort; this is particularly true of NSA, DIA, and CIA. And, second, I suspect that many members of the intelligence community have satisfied themselves that there is no reason for outside funding and have therefore made only a limited effort to determine if, in fact, there is any outside funding.

The largest and most successful revolutionary organization is the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS): There are many good reasons to believe that this group has not received nor sought financial support from foreign Communists. It is not difficult for a broadly based ideological organization to raise \$84,000 a year, which is the estimated SDS national budget, and we have reason to believe that several prominent American leftists have contributed large amounts to the organization in the past several years (two individuals are reported to have contributed \$40,000 each.) Reliable evidence indicates that SDS is capable of raising substantial funds through contributions from its members and from the sale of its literature. In terms of immediate financial requirements, the organization appears to be self-supporting.

There are several other reasons why I doubt that SDS has been funded by foreign Communists. First, SDS leaders tend to be suspicious of organized Communism, and although most of them are great admirers of Mao and Castro, I doubt if they would seek financial support from the Chinese or Cuban governments for fear that strings would be attached which

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would compromise their independent approach to revolution. Second, and more important, I am dubious that foreign Communists would regard the funding of SDS as a good investment. American dollars are scarce resources which Cuba and Red China would spend only for the most compelling reasons and where the benefits were likely to be significant and obvious. If SDS is capable of financing through its own efforts a successful revolutionary program, there would appear to be little reason for either Cuba or Red China to offer financial support. And, finally, I believe that foreign Communists would be leary of financing SDS because of the uncertainty which doctrinaire Communists must feel toward the anarchistic tendencies of the organization and its leadership. Were disciplined Communists to take over the organization (as the PL people very nearly did at the SDS national convention in Chicago last month), an incentive might exist. However, so long as the "Crazies" (those who profess loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, but who reject disciplined party control, e.g., Mark Rudd, the SDS leader at Columbia) effectively control the national office of SDS, I think any substantial foreign Communist financial investment would be of minimal value to either Cuba or Red China, and I suspect they would share this opinion.

The likelihood or advisability of foreign Communist financial support of the other revolutionary organizations is less clear. The FBI has reason to believe that there may be more than minimal support being rendered, but it has not been able to turn up hard evidence to support its suspicion. Part of the problem, I believe, is the failure of CIA to devote its resources abroad to this problem and the lack of careful coordination within the intelligence community to insure that all potentially available information is being collected and analyzed. This problem is discussed in detail elsewhere in this report.

As previously indicated, we do have some evidence that SNCC and PL have received financial support from Cuba and/or Red China. And although we don't presently have any evidence to confirm it, I believe that it is very possible that the Black Panthers are receiving some financial support from foreign Communists.

Virtually all the logical reasons which can be mustered to support the argument that SDS is not receiving foreign Communist support are absent in the cases of PL, SNCC, and the Black Panthers. The latter groups do not appear to have sufficient support within the wealthy liberal community to raise substantial funds at home and their membership is not large enough or affluent enough to contribute substantial amounts through dues or contributions to meet budgetary requirements. More importantly, these groups tend to be more disciplined and more susceptible to foreign Communist control and influence.

The Progressive Labor Party was officially recognized by Peking in 1967 as the only revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party in the United States. It has made a point for several years of claiming to be the official

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Chinese Communist Party in the United States, and Luce told me that while he was in the Party, one high ranking official claimed that the Party was receiving financial support from the Chinese. In the last year, however, there has been a serious ideological quarrel between PL and the Black Panthers over which group is really the "official" Chinese Communist Party in this country, with both claiming the support of Peking. We do not know precisely how Peking presently views the two contenders for its favor, but it is possible that both organizations serve its purpose, and the Chinese may fund and support them accordingly.

The evidence indicates that the Cubans have also looked with favor on PL, but there is some reason to believe that in the past two years the relations between the two have become less cordial. Castro appears to be keenly interested in the black revolutionary groups in this country and may believe that they represent the best hope for a successful revolutionary struggle in the United States.

Delegations of SDS leaders have made frequent trips to Cuba, but it appears that their principal interest has been to meet with representatives of Hanoi and the NLF stationed in Havana. We have no reports of SDS leaders returning from Havana with promises of financial support from Castro. The Cubans apparently wish to keep the lines of communication open to all groups which are sympathetic and the number of visits to the Island have increased substantially over the last 18 months. On June 10, 1969, a group of 20 New Left members visited Cuba and available information indicates that all expenses over and above transportation were borne by the Cuban Government. Another trip for a similar group is planned for this month.

When Stokely Carmichael visited Havana for the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference in July of 1967, he was treated as a hero by the Castro government. However, as is typically true of Stokely, he broke with Castro over the question of the class struggle and he is no longer held in high esteem by official Cuban Communist circles.

However, the Cubans have continued to look with interest on the development of a revolutionary black movement in the United States, and it appears that Castro has hoped to find within SNCC and the Black Panthers the type of disciplined leadership that can successfully wage revolution along traditional Marxist-Leninist lines.

We have a report that Virginia Collins, a leader of the Republic of New Africa, visited Havana this Spring and met with Castro. Reportedly he told her that he was unhappy with the dissension among black extremist organizations in Los Angeles, but added that when the black people in the United States move forward in their revolution, they will receive assistance from Cuba.

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In September of 1968, Irving Davis, a SNCC leader in New York City, traveled to Cuba where representatives of the Cuban Government allegedly told him that Cuba was ready to assist SNCC with financial and other means of support in its struggle in the United States. However, before aid was to be given, SNCC was to give concrete evidence of revolutionary activity in the next six months.

Recent developments involving the Black Panthers have cast an interesting light on the relations between that organization and Castro. On June 25, 1969, Raymond Johnson, who claimed to be a lieutenant in the Black Panthers and who is living in Havana, complained to the press that he and other Panthers have been "isolated and imprisoned" and want to leave the country. He said the "the Panthers have not been received in a revolutionary fashion; we have been condemned to live in Cuba." He also added that he thought there was racial discrimination in Cuba.

Two days later, Bobby Seale, the national Chairman of the Panthers, told a press conference in San Francisco that Johnson was "nothing but an agent for the fascist CIA and FBI." [REDACTED]

Seale's prompt reaction to Johnson's statement and his stern denunciation of a fellow black who claimed to be a member of the BPP suggests the importance which the Panthers attach to their relations with Castro. The BPP regards Castro as a revolutionary hero and comrade in the struggle against white imperialism, and obviously Seale did not want to risk jeopardizing his relations with Cuba by allowing a black malcontent to implicate the BPP in criticism of the Cuban regime. Seale was doubtless also aware that one problem which the Panthers and other black extremist groups have in seeking foreign financial support is convincing their potential benefactors that the investment will pay dividends. Although less cautious and more "revolutionary" than the Soviets, the Cubans and Chinese are not foolish. They are not likely to invest scarce foreign exchange in organizations over which they have only minimal control or which are so distracted by internal dissension that they are unable to conduct a successful revolutionary program. There is little doubt that the Cubans particularly, and the Chinese as well, would very much like to acquire a strong influence over the black militants. It remains to be seen if they will be successful in doing so.

Although the Communists would like to see a single, unified, broadly-based black revolutionary front, they may be forced to accept the reality -- at least for the near-term -- of a series of small black groups struggling among themselves. However, the Black Panthers appear to have the potential for becoming a large and powerful revolutionary force, preeminent

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within the black community. At the present time, it would appear to represent the best target of opportunity for foreign Communist exploitation, particularly since SNCC has diminished in influence, if not in revolutionary fervor.

On July 3, 1969, Stokely Carmichael denounced the Black Panthers for its alliances with white groups. He called the Panther's methods "dishonest and vicious." It is impossible to believe that Carmichael would have any scruples about the legal or moral virtue of a revolutionary organization if he believed it was following the correct road to revolution. At the heart of his disagreement with the leadership of the Panthers is his refusal to accept the traditional Communist theory of the class struggle. He rejects this line, holding that the world-wide revolutionary struggle is racial, and the revolution must be waged along racial, not class, lines.

Carmichael's break with the Panther leadership suggests that he has lost this ideological struggle within the top councils of the organization (he lost a similar struggle within SNCC, from which he was expelled in 1967.) I tend to believe that the significance of Carmichael's attack is to be found in the inference which it supports that the present Panther leadership has opted for a black-white revolutionary alliance which adheres to traditional Communist theories about the nature of the revolutionary struggle, i.e., it is waged along class lines.

This analysis of recent events within the Panther organization suggests that the Panthers are acquiring a rigid Marxist-Leninist orientation and are likely to seek and receive extensive foreign Communist support, financial and otherwise, in the days ahead.

In a report conspicuous for the absence of hard facts, the CIA declared that the "relative lack of firm Agency-developed information on the subject may either represent the true situation, i.e., the absence of extensive foreign Communist support, or it may be a reflection of a lack of enough well placed sources." I tend to believe that it is the latter. I suspect, as do some high ranking intelligence experts at the FBI and [REDACTED] that there has been more financial support rendered by the Communists than we know about. More important, I believe that there is likely to be a great deal more such support in the future as the leaders of revolutionary organizations recognize that revolution is possible only through disciplined leadership -- and disciplined revolutionary leadership is Communist leadership.

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IV. CONTACTS BETWEEN LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GROUPS

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In addition to the channels of communication open to foreign Communists within the confines of the United States, leaders of the U.S. revolutionary protest movement have in recent years begun to reach out beyond the continental limits of the United States to solicit the support of foreign Communists and revolutionary movements abroad. New Leftists and black extremists travel abroad extensively and participate freely in various international conferences which are invariably attended by and sometimes sponsored by Communists. At the same time revolutionaries frequently travel to the United States and confer with leaders of the protest movement in this country.

Cuba and North Vietnam have been particularly strong magnets for New Left protest groups. Much of the strength of these organizations derives from their ability to maintain close relationships and dialogues with foreign Communist establishments. For instance, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains a foreign contact list of over 300 individuals and organizations throughout the world. Its chairman, David Dellinger, has traveled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam. His relationship with the North Vietnamese is so intimate that last week they insisted upon his presence in Paris before they would even discuss the promised release of three American prisoners of war. The State Department dutifully complied with this request and Dellinger was released from the cognizance of the Federal District Court in Chicago where he is under indictment in connection with the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention so that he might fly to Paris. The NMC and Dellinger maintain almost constant contact with the Governments of Cuba and North Vietnam (DRV) and representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Dellinger feels -- rightly it appears -- that such contacts give the NMC and himself notoriety and build their image in the movement.

Since 1965 there has been close coordination and cooperation between U.S. antiwar groups and the North Vietnamese and NLF. An interesting account of the international coordination which culminated in the 1967 March on the Pentagon is at Tab A.

American revolutionary leaders are frequently in attendance at international conferences at which the strategy of revolution is the central topic under discussion. Frequently these conferences have been held for the exclusive purpose of coordinating the world-wide protest against U.S. policy in Vietnam. On several instances these sessions have

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been held at the request of the National Liberation Front as in the case of the Stockholm Conference which took place in May of this year at the request of the NLF and DRV delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, chief NLF negotiator in Paris, headed the NLF delegation at the Stockholm Conference. Both the NLF and DRV delegations showed considerable concern over the deteriorating anti-war movement in the U.S. and indicated that without public opinion in the U.S. calling for American troop withdrawal, their efforts to achieve victory would be handicapped. They urged those attending the conference, particularly those from the United States, to revitalize the deteriorating anti-war sentiment.

An interesting and representative sampling of the international conferences attended by American revolutionary leaders is at Tab B.

The ease with which foreign revolutionary leaders can enter the United States has contributed to the international exchange of revolutionary ideas and programs. If the United States decided to abolish the visa requirement for foreign visitors as is presently contemplated, the number of foreign revolutionaries entering the United States is likely to increase substantially. Information on previous visits by these foreign activists is at Tab C.

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V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

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Historically, the United States has been the target for subversive activities emanating from and directed by the international Communist movement in an effort to foment disorder and disruption in a revolutionary vein. The change from the monolithic nature of the movement to polycentrism only served to magnify the problem in that it diversified the subversive attack.

Regardless of the diversification, the basic nature of the attack remained the same. It emanated from Communist forces abroad and was channeled into this country through Communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and old-line Communist groups and organizations working to advance international Communism.

From the standpoint of the FBI's responsibility to counter these subversive thrusts, there were two significant factors which enabled it to mount effective counterintelligence operations.

The first factor was that the activities took place for the most part within our borders. It was a situation which lent itself to effective utilization of manpower for coverage and counterintelligence purposes.

The second factor was that the activities were engaged in by organizations, such as the CPUSA, which were tightly structured organizationally in the traditional pattern of Communist parties throughout the world. As such, they presented clear-cut targets for informant penetration.

Because these old-line organizations also followed the traditional pattern of operating under the concept of democratic centralism with an insistence on rigid discipline throughout party ranks, high-level informant penetration provided an insight into strategy and tactics being considered at all levels. Here, too, it was possible to effectively negate their thrusts.

The emergence of the New Left and black extremist movements in our society drastically altered the situation. They evolved mostly out of social reform movements which increasingly have been transformed into hard-core revolutionary movements dedicated to the total destruction of our democratic traditions and our society.

They produced a new breed of revolutionaries whose main preoccupation with Communism is that it has produced men like Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevarra, whom they hope to emulate in the overthrow of a system they deem oppressive.

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From the inception of these movements, the FBI has been aware of the fact that their increasingly revolutionary Communist imprint posed new and unique problems for the internal security of this nation.

As these forces of revolutionary protest hardened in their resolve to accomplish their purpose, more and more they reached out to join hands with and seek support not only from old-line Communists inside our country, but also from Communists and anarchists abroad.

In effect, the picture has changed from one in which international Communist forces sought out supporters within our country to carry out their objectives to one in which domestic revolutionaries are reaching out in search of support from anyone, including Communists, throughout the world who will help and support them in their own destructive aims.

Since the objectives of both so clearly coincide, it is inevitable that they will join forces in common cause. The willingness of the Soviets, Chinese, and Cubans to support the efforts of domestic revolutionaries in this country has been demonstrated. In addition, the movement of the New Left and black extremist revolutionary protestors toward increasingly centralized, more tightly disciplined organizations will facilitate the inevitable linkings.

It is essential that we bring together and intensify the intelligence capabilities of our country to meet this growing threat. It is imperative that we penetrate all the channels of communication between foreign Communist forces and domestic revolutionaries; that we take all possible additional investigative steps to safeguard the security of this nation in a time of multiplying and expanding crises. This has become mandatory because of increasing problems which may be anticipated in the future by reason of the growing alliances with foreign Communist elements.

There are significant gaps in our present intelligence collection efforts which are likely to grow in the future. I am convinced that the FBI is doing, with the resources presently available, a fine job of monitoring the revolutionary leaders and activities which take place in this country. However, CIA coverage of contacts by U.S. revolutionary leaders with Communists abroad is totally inadequate. In fact, I am convinced that CIA has failed to assign an adequate priority to this problem and is not making good use of the resources presently at its disposal.

From an intelligence point of view, we face several significant problems in adequately covering the activities of U.S. revolutionary protest organizations.

(1) Political Limitations. Since the exposure by Ramparts magazine of CIA use of American student and trade union organizations as covers for intelligence collection activities abroad, CIA has been forced to cut back

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significantly its collection efforts in this area. Moreover, concern of exposure has created an unhealthy caution at CIA which has resulted in too extensive a cutback. However, there are very real political limitations on a full-scale intelligence collection effort. Many responsible Americans, liberal and conservative alike, are vigorously opposed to government surveillance on the activities of American citizens. NSA is prohibited by law from targeting against the communications of U.S. citizens, and the public fervor over the exposure of FBI wiretaps has accentuated the problem. Public exposure of the fact that the Government is monitoring the activities of U.S. student and peace groups would likely result in an outrage on the part of a significant portion of the public.

(2) Geographical Limitations. Most of the activities which we wish to cover occur in denied areas, i.e., in Communist countries. This poses serious problems for us even if the CIA were making a full-scale effort to acquire the information we need. [REDACTED]

(3) Inter-Agency Coordination. The members of the intelligence community do not coordinate their activities in a fashion that is even minimally adequate. While I have found no evidence to suggest that one agency withholds information which it has available, I have found far too many instances where more extensive and valuable intelligence could have been acquired if the intelligence community worked more closely together in the selection of targets and the pooling of sources. I am convinced that the intelligence community is not taking full advantage [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We are not getting all the information potentially available from our present resources simply because of inadequate coordination within the intelligence community.

(4) Utilization of Intelligence. It is not of much assistance to know what the revolutionary organizations are doing if that information is not utilized in planning appropriate countermeasures. I was surprised to learn that, although student disorders and mass protests have been with us for nearly a half decade, this is the first time any effort has been made to pull together information available within the intelligence community on the problem. However, even the most exhaustive collection of intelligence data is worthless unless it provides the policy formulator information upon the basis of which he can determine what steps should be taken to meet the problem of revolutionary violence. Currently, there are at least six staff offices in the White House, five at the Justice Department, and half a dozen at HEW dealing with aspects of this problem. None are aware of what the others are doing and none have the entire problem in perspective so that a government-wide, coordinated approach to the problem can be undertaken.

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I believe that, after inflation, revolutionary violence is the most pressing domestic problem confronting this country. Yet, there is no in-depth analysis of the total problem, no significant effort to develop a comprehensive program to deal with it, and no single individual, staff element, or agency responsible for working on it.

Revolutionary violence, from student disorders to urban riots, is largely one problem. Yet, we have approached the problem much like the proverbial blind men and the elephant, feeling a leg here, a trunk there -- feeling only a small portion of it, we have failed to clearly identify exactly what the problem is we are confronting. The result has not only been inaction, but a disarming assurance that it is likely to go away if only we recognize the "legitimate" grievances which we think it represents.

I do not believe that a Communist revolution in this country is likely or probable. I do believe that Communist revolutionary violence is not only likely, but inevitable if the Government does not take steps to thwart it. Several intelligence officers in different agencies told me in the course of my study that they believe we are confronted with the most serious threat to our internal security in their lifetime. And the greatest threat is our blindness to the nature of what is occurring around us in the country today.

I am convinced that it is possible to break the back of the revolutionary protest movement, perhaps in less time than it will take to end the war in Vietnam, if -- and only if -- all the resources of the government, including its ability to educate and motivate the private sector, are mobilized in a carefully conceived and meticulously administered program.

The major difficulty I see in dealing with this problem is convincing top-level government leadership that we must adopt a program which couples the stick with the carrot if we are to have any hope at all of solving it. At the time we are putting the screws to the militants on the campus, we must simultaneously hold out some promise of reform to moderate students; at the time we are busting up the Black Panthers, we must be taking steps which reassure the moderate Negro leadership. This requires the closest possible coordination, and I am not convinced this is even remotely possible in government.

However, we have a very serious problem on our hands, and it is my hope that an equally serious effort to solve it will be made.

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CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. PEACE MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN  
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR PENTAGON  
PEACE DEMONSTRATION OF 21 OCTOBER 1967

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- (1) On 19 April 1967, David Dellinger was contacted by VIETPEACE (the VN Peace Committee - Hanoi) to arrange for a group of four to come to Hanoi "for some pressing discussions." Dellinger was given a list of people from whom the group was to be recruited (among the names suggested were Staughton Lynd, former Yale professor; Stokley Carmichael; Floyd McKissick; Dagmar Wilson; and a member of SDS selected by Dellinger.)
- (2) Dellinger arrived in Hanoi on 26 May. Although he had planned to stay a week, he did not leave until about 11 June.
- (3) From 6 to 9 July, representatives of VIETPEACE and the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (a U.S. "peace" group) met in Stockholm for discussions.
- (4) On 17 July, the Rev. James Bevel, Director of the Spring Mobilization Committee and also a leader in Martin Luther King's SCLC, contacted Do Xuan Oanh, Secretary of VIETPEACE, in Hanoi saying that he was "anxiously waiting reply concerning our Stockholm discussion" and suggesting that they meet for further consultation "in Paris, Prague or elsewhere." Do Xuan Oanh replied "the problem has been discussed already, reported to the authorities and is under consideration."
- (5) Between 25 July and 17 August, Dellinger and Do Xuan Oanh had numerous contacts regarding arrangements for a large meeting of anti-war activists to be held in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia from 5 to 13 September. On 4 August Dellinger informed VIETPEACE that "plans are progressing well" and that he preferred to send the list of delegates and proposed agenda to Prague. A list of the U.S. participants was provided the North Vietnamese on 19 September.

- (7) Following the Bratislava meeting, a group of the delegates, including Tom Hayden and Renne Davis of SDS, flew to Hanoi.

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**p. 44 of 55 pages**

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