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THE KHMER KRAHOM PROGRAM TO CREATE
A COMMUNIST SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN CAMBODIA

19 FEBRUARY 1974
1. The attached reports analyzes and describes in detail the program of the Khmer Krahom (KK) faction of the Khmer Communist (KC) movement to politically reorganize, restructure and transform Khmer society in those parts of Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces of Cambodia which lie along the border of Government of Vietnam (GVN) Military Region (MR4). The KK in this part of Cambodia started this program in the beginning of 1972 when they broke off an alliance with the pro-Sihanouk forces which had been in effect since March 1970. Their attempt to alter Khmer society is comprised of a large number of policies and programs, implemented through a well-disciplined administrative apparatus. These policies aim at: (a) insuring firm control over the population and repressing political opposition; (b) psychologically reorienting the citizenry; (c) collectivizing and communizing the agricultural and economic systems; and (d) reforming certain social, religious and cultural institutions and practices.

2. Based on our analysis of these KK policies, programs and institutions, we make the following observations:

a. The United Front (FUNK) has been disassembled in this part of Cambodia: while many people may prefer him, Prince Sihanouk has little or no authority in the southern parts of Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces. Authority there is firmly in the hands of the Khmer Krahom, who have demonstrated that their alliance with the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdoah (KR) was only one of temporary convenience: they no longer support the Prince and their aims at communizing Khmer society do not include any provision for royalty.

b. The Khmer Krahom's programs have much in common with those of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, particularly regarding efforts to psychologically reconstruct individual members of society. In short, this process entails stripping away, through terror and other means, the traditional bases, structures and forces which have shaped and guided an individual's life until he is left as an atomized, isolated individual unit; and then rebuilding him according to party doctrine by substituting a series of new values, organizations and ethical norms for the ones taken away. The first half of this process can be found in the KK attack on religion, the destruction of vestiges of the Sihanouk regime, attacks on parental and monastical authority, prohibitions on traditional songs and dances, and the use of terror. Psychological atomization, which can result from these practices and which causes individuals to feel effectively isolated from the rest of their community, can be seen to have actually occurred: refugees from Kampot and Kandal Provinces have said they were so afraid of arrest and execution that even in their own homes they dared not utter a critical word and obediently complied with every KK directive. The final process of restructing of these individuals into "productive members of the communist society" consisted of night propaganda meetings, intensive political training, membership in people's associations, and communal farming.
c. The KK administrative apparatus is well-organized, well-disciplined, and capable of carrying out major political and social programs. The effort to communize Khmer society is being carried out simultaneously and in a uniform manner in Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces, as well as in nearby Svay Rieng Province, despite the fact that these provinces are located in three different KC military regions. This would seem to indicate the existence of a strong central party which is developing programs and issuing orders which are carried out by loyal and disciplined provincial and district-level cadre.

d. While people have fled when possible and a majority of the population seems opposed to the KK's programs, there has been little organized or effective opposition: people are complying with KK rules and regulations. Thus, barring any outside interference, the KK will most likely grow stronger and their degree of control and authority more certain in southern Kampot, Takeo and Kandal. Outside interference could come from either the VC/NVA and/or the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rundoah. Recent developments indicate that the KR are moving to reassert some influence in Kampot and Takeo, however, the scope and probability of success of such an effort are still extremely uncertain.

Excised

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6. Summary
1. Introduction

In those districts of Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces adjacent to Government of Vietnam (GVN) Military Region 4 (MR4) (Kampong Trach, Banteay Meas and Angkor Chey Districts of Kampot; Kirivong, Prey Krabas and Kaoh Andet Districts of Takeo; and Kaoh Thom and Leuk Dek Districts of Kandal), the Khmer Communist movement (KC) is composed of two factions, the Khmer Krahom (KK) and the Khmer Rumdoah (KR). While the KK and KR are united in their opposition to the Lon Nol Government, they differ on several basic points:

a. The Khmer Krahom are communists (in fact, their organization is the Communist Party) who seek to bring about a peasants' revolution which will lead to the establishment of a communist state directed by a central party committee. The Khmer Rumdoah are royalists whose goal is to restore Prince Sihanouk to power and regain the tranquility of pre-Lon Nol traditional society.

b. The KK aim to repress the Buddhist Church and usurp its position of authority in Khmer society. The KR respect religion and desire to maintain it in its traditional position of pre-eminence.

c. The KK plan to confiscate land and collectivize agriculture. The KR wish to retain the status quo.

d. The KK favor strict travel and trade controls and harsh penalties for breaking them. The KR do not.

e. The KK are strongly anti-Vietnamese and desire to force all VC and NVA units out of Cambodia. The KR, on the other hand, are in favor of full cooperation with the VC/NVA.

Beginning in late 1971 the KK gained control of the KC movement in this border area. Since that time they have had three major goals: driving the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army out of Cambodia; creating a communist society; and undermining the legitimacy and popularity of Prince Sihanouk. This paper will describe, and assess the results of, KK efforts to achieve these last two goals. Their anti-VC/NVA campaign is described in Can Tho A-003 and will not be repeated here.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first is basically a chronology of events in this area from 18 March 1970 to the present, including a description of the struggle between the pro and anti-Sihanouk factions
for control of the movement. There follows a detailed description of the various KK institutions, organizations, programs, and policies. This section treats mass relocations of populations and isolation of ethnic Khmers from Vietnamese and Vietnamese-controlled areas; the institution of new governmental structures; economic leveling; re-education of the population; creation and activities of people's associations; attacks on religion and the secularization of monks; establishment of economic cooperatives; the communization of land, production and distribution; regimentation of minority groups; enforced austerity and taxation; the development of the army and local militias; and the use of terror and torture. Finally, there is a brief summary of the popular reaction to these programs.

The data for this report comes from: ConGen officers' interviews with refugees from Cambodia now located in the GVN border provinces of Chau Doc and Kien Giang; information provided through regular contacts within the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN); other American sources; and one lengthy interview with the former KC Village Chief of Russei Srok Village, Kampong Trach District, Kompot Province, who fled his home village after three and one-half years as its head man. His reporting has been cross-checked with other independent accounts of the same events and has been found to be consistent with them. We, therefore, give his information a high reliability and have used it extensively in documenting this paper.

Before proceeding, a note is necessary about the terms used to denote the organizations (and members thereof) within the movement opposing the Lon Nol Government now referred to in US Government correspondence as the Khmer Communists. As stated above, there are two principal factions comprising this force in this part of Cambodia: the Khmer Krahom, who are communists, and the Khmer Rumdoah (alternate spelling - "Rumdos"), who are not. Krahom is the Cambodian word for red and refers to the organization previously known as the Khmer Rouge. As the name suggests, this organization is the Khmer Communist Party. Care should be taken not to confuse the Khmer Krahom with Khmer Krom (Cambodian for under) which refers in general to those Cambodians living down under in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam and, in particular, to armed bands (and bandit gangs) of ethnic Cambodians who operated in Vietnam during the 1950s and 1960s, some of whom returned to Cambodia and were integrated into the National Armed Forces of Kampuchea (FANK) after Lon Nol's rise to power. Rumdoah, which literally means liberation, is now used to refer to the pro-Sihanouk members of the KC. They are so called because they joined with the KK to form the Khmer Liberation Front (Khmer Rumdoah) after the Prince's downfall in 1970.
Actually they are royalists. Thus, the term Khmer Rumdoah can refer to either the pro-Sihanouk faction within the KC or to the Front organization headed by Sihanouk which incorporated both his followers and the KK. For purposes of consistency, the term Khmer Insurgents (KI) which was previously used to identify all the forces opposed to Lon Nol and which appears in much of the referenced reporting, is not used.

While it is convenient when discussing the Cambodian rebel movement in general to refer to all the insurgents as the Khmer Communists, to do so in as detailed an analysis as this is only to invite further obfuscation. It is important here to distinguish between the Khmer Krahom who are communists and should properly be called the Khmer Communists and the Khmer Rumdoah who are not and should not. The programs and policies described in this report are the work of the Khmer Krahom and should be attributed to them only. To emphasize this point, throughout the paper we have used their name rather than the more widely used "Khmer Communist" term, which would probably be understood to include all the rebels. However, in a few instances such as referring to high levels of the rebel movement and certain military boundaries, we have retained the use of Khmer Communist appellation since no factional distinction can be made regarding them.

2. Background

Recent History: Recent events in this part of Cambodia seem to fall into three distinct periods:

-- from prior to the 18 March 1970 coup d'etat to the end of 1971;
-- from the beginning of 1972 until early 1973; and
-- from early 1973 to the present.

Prior to his fall, Prince Sihanouk led an established and functioning government which maintained offices and schools in most villages and provided certain basic services. The insurgent movement opposing it consisted mainly of the Khmer Krahom and existed entirely in jungle redoubts, possessing none of the characteristics of an organized government. On 18 March 1970, Prince Sihanouk was overthrown, and shortly thereafter the following events occurred in the areas bordering GVN M34:

a. Suffering from the after-effects of the revolution—i.e., a lack of direction, organization and loyal cadre—the FANK and the remnants of the civilian government withdrew from many villages and hamlets to the district and province towns.

b. Pro-Sihanouk forces formed an alliance with the KK called the Khmer Liberation Front (Khmer Rumdos) (KLF), headed by the Prince.
c. Some of the KK emerged from the jungle and as part of the KLF moved into the vacuum left by the FANK and the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) by establishing province and district governments. This was known as the Royal United National Front Government of Cambodia (Reach Rothaphibal Ronasey Ruoprumpchet Kampuchea) which we usually refer to as GRUNK. It is important to note here that the Front (KLF or FUNK) and the Government (GRUNK) are separate entities with the Front organizing the government.

d. This government proceeded to organize village and hamlet governments with popularly-elected chairmen.1

This situation—FANK controlling the district and provincial capitals, the main lines of communication and certain villages, and the rest of the countryside in the hands of the KLF (along with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army) persisted in the border area until early 1972 when two important events took place: the KK gained control of the KLF and dropped its allegiance to Sihanouk; and the KK began their program to communize Cambodian society, the main theme of which was that Cambodia was now going through a total—though not yet completed—social revolution and everything that had preceded it was anathema and must be destroyed.2 In addition to doing away with the Front (they now openly called themselves the Khmer Krahom and no longer used the term Khmer Rumdoah), they sought to destroy all the vestiges of and reference to the old royal society. Immediately, they dropped the term "Royal" (Reach) from the title of their opposition government and replaced it with the word "Kana", which means sect, party or committee making the new title of the government in the areas they controlled "Kana Rothaphibal Ronasey Ruoprumpchet Kampuchea" (or the "Party Government of the United National Front").3 They also embarked on a campaign to eliminate symbols of the old regime and to that end destroyed most of the schools and governmental offices built by the Sihanouk Government. They also changed the names and terms of reference of province and district governments.4 For instance, the word which both the Sihanouk and Lon Nol Governments used for province—Khet—was replaced by the word "Dumbon", which means area or sector. Not satisfied with a change in mere terms of reference, the KK also eliminated the proper names of all provinces and districts and substituted numbers for them. Thus, Kampot Province became Area 35, Takeo became Area 13, and Kandal was called Area 25. Districts went through the same process; for example, Kampong Trach District was changed to District 77.5 Interestingly, the words for hamlet, village and district
(phum, khum and srok) were not changed nor the proper names of any village or hamlet. It is emphasized that these numbers were not just part of an internal code for secret or official use but became the proper name by which all citizens referred to these administrative divisions. In addition to destroying the old, the KK began "building the new". They started a land reform program, set up cooperative stores, and outlawed certain social extravagances such as colorful dress (which was described as not in keeping with the sacrifices being made by patriotic soldiers and—in the case of young girls—causing a certain yearning on the part of these same soldiers which distracted them from their primary task). The first indication of an anti-VC/NVA policy also cropped up at this time in the form of a requirement that all VC/NVA troop movement have prior KK permission. However, because of superior VC/NVA strength and the other problems facing them, the KK did not try to enforce it.

While the KK were devoting some attention to the above, their main effort during this second period was trying to eliminate the FANK. In March 1972 they began an offensive which by mid-year had: driven the FANK from Kampong Trach District town, cut Route 2 between Tunloap District town (VS 8775) and Takeo city; pushed FANK out of some outposts in the 0 Mountain complex (VS 6885-8770) near Tunloap and destroyed the FANK District Headquarters of Kaoh Thom District which was located at Chrey Thom Hamlet (WT 0912) approximately 100 meters from the SVN border and the nearest GVN outpost. FANK never recovered in Kampong Trach or Kaoh Thom and the only further obstacles the KK ever met there came from ARVN or the VC/NVA.

In Takeo, through the assistance of ARVN, the FANK was able to make a substantial recovery. In mid-1972, the 14th Regiment of the ARVN 9th Division conducted operations along Route 2 which re-opened it from Takeo to Tunloap and restored many of the FANK outposts in the 0 Mountain complex and other areas adjacent to the highway. So, by the end of 1972, while the KK had been successful in large parts of Kampong Trach and Kaoh Thom Districts, it was still confronted with a FANK presence in Kirivong and Kaoh Andet Districts of Takeo, as well as by major VC/NVA occupation of large segments of all three provinces.

This situation remained the same until the spring of 1973 when the KK opened a final offensive designed at eliminating all FANK presence. By March 1973 they had again closed down Route 2 and had overrun or forced the abandonment of all the outposts along and adjacent to it except for those in Tunloap and Thnal Bek (VS 7895). In many instances, the KK,
having overrun a FANK position, proceeded to burn down some or all of
the private houses forcing the residents to flee. It was during this
period that approximately 15,000 ethnic Cambodians sought refuge in
Chau Doc Province, where they remain today. The KK continued this
pressure through April—when Thnal Bek fell—and into May when they
finally forced the FANK 15th Brigade to abandon its last position at
Phnom Dem and retreat into SVN, thus effectively ending any meaningful
GKR presence in southern Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces.¹ (The
fall of Kep City later in the year left no FANK presence in the area
between the SVN border and a line drawn from Kampot City through Takeo
City to Neak Luong, save for two Navy bases on the west bank of the
Mekong about five kilometers north of the SVN border. This same situ-
uation pertains today.)

With FANK effectively out of the way, the KK in May began an intensive
three-pronged effort aimed at accelerating the communization of society,
driving the VC/NVA out of Cambodia and discrediting Sihanouk.² Their
anti-VC/NVA effort, described extensively in Can Tho A-003, will not
be repeated here. The communization process which involves a full
range of social, economic, political, religious, cultural and military
programs, is covered in detail in paragraph 3 below.

Khmer Krahom-Khmer Rumdoah Split: This new anti-Sihanouk Campaign was
more vitriolic and virulent than the KK effort in 1972, which had merely
featured polemics and reshuffling pro-Sihanouk cadre out of positions of
power. The campaign began in early 1973 when the KK reportedly began a
purge of ex-Sihanouk loyalists and cadre in eastern Kampot Province.³
This campaign was aimed at anyone who had served in the Sihanouk Govern-
ment prior to the 1970 coup including village chiefs, minor functionaries
and even village guards, and resulted in many arrests in the Tuk Meas and
Sre Chea areas. At least ten of these people were known to have been
taken to the KK prison (VS 327818) and subsequently executed.⁴ At the
same time, the KK kept up their propaganda effort against the Prince
personally, accusing him of living well in Peking while the people suf-
fered, staying outside Cambodia too long, and supporting "the hated
Vietnamese"—a reference to Sihanouk's support of the VC and NVA.⁵ In
one case, KK propaganda cadre even went so far as to equate Sihanouk
with Lon Nol and the NVA as enemies of the revolution.⁶ The anti-
Sihanouk theme was allegedly sounded as well by the Chairman of KK Area
35 (Kampot Province). He reportedly personally told a gathering of monks
that Sihanouk was only a figurehead with no real authority.⁷
These continued verbal attacks on Sihanouk greatly increased friction between the KK and KR rank and file—especially within the military where the great majority were pro-Sihanouk—and eventually led to fighting between the two factions. The first outbreak occurred on November 6 in two hamlets of Kampong Trach District: in two nearly identical incidents, KK and KR members of the same military units opened fire on each other. Both fire fights resulted from KR opposition to the KK plan for forcibly relocate the population. Two weeks later inter-faction fighting broke out again in Kampot, this time at Banteay Meas Hamlet (VS 5971), when KK cadre and soldiers came to control the rice harvest. The local residents and KR cadre refused to go along with the KK plan for the harvest. They were incensed, too, over the KK’s reference to Sihanouk as an “imperialist leading a feudal regime”. Fighting broke out and both sides suffered minor losses. The local KR then rallied about 500 villagers to come to their aid and, armed with scythes, machetes and hatchets, drove the KK off, killing nine and wounding twenty. A few weeks later, on December 6, another such clash involving only the use of sharpened farm implements took place near Tuk Meas on Route 16 (VS 515808). It reportedly involved about 400 KK and 500 KR troops. Despite the fact that no firearms and only implements were used, over 100 men were killed or injured. Region level KK cadre attempted to intervene in this strife but apparently to no avail, for on January 24 a large pro-Sihanouk force was reported maneuvering to gain control of all of Route 16 from Tani to Tuk Meas, as well as part of Route 205 east of Tani.

There are indications that this fighting has weakened the command structure in Region 405, which includes Area 35 (Kampot). The Regional Chairman, Ta Mok, has had his authority and influence over the KK in southern Kampot and Takeo reduced because of his pro-NVA and pro-Sihanouk stands and, in fact, was even ambushed and slightly wounded by the KK once in late November while traveling with some NVA soldiers on Route 16.

While the KK in Kampot Province forsook all allegiance to Sihanouk in late 1971, in Kandal Province the KK found it expedient to publicly support the Prince until the middle of 1973. In fact, as late as September 1973, KK draftees were told they were going to fight to enable Sihanouk to return to power. However, two months later, the two factions were at each other’s throats. On November 3, the KK kidnapped three KR
cadre near Angkor Borei Mountain (VT 9710) who have not been seen since and were presumably executed.\textsuperscript{1} One day later, KK cadre of Area 25 (Kandal Province) met with KR cadre from Area 24 (Prey Veng Province) at Rokar Chhor Hamlet (WT 247307) on the west bank of the Mekong River. The KK demanded that the KR (who control the KC movement in Prey Veng) terminate their policy of cooperating with the VC and NVA in Area 24. The KR refused, the discussion grew heated, and a firefight ensued. The KR, supported by a nearby VC/NVA unit, killed 42 KK and drove the rest off.\textsuperscript{2} Since that time, the KK and KR have conducted raids across the Mekong into each other's territory. In December KR from Prey Veng arrested a village chief in Kandal Province,\textsuperscript{3} while the KK from Kandal harassed the VC/NVA in the Ca Sach area of Prey Veng.\textsuperscript{4} Also in December the KK in Kandal dropped the masquerade of supporting Sihanouk and publicly identified themselves as members of the Communist Party led by Khieu Samphan.\textsuperscript{5} In late December they staged rallies in populated areas which affirmed the anti-Vietnamese and anti-Sihanouk character of their policy.\textsuperscript{6} NOTE: The announcement of Khieu Samphan as head of the KK is of some significance. According to American sources, much confusion surrounds Samphan's place in the Khmer Krahom movement: there has even been speculation that he is a mythical person. A long-time member of the Khmer Rouge (as we then called the Khmer Krahom), Samphan is believed to have served originally as party chairman for Kandal Province, which is especially interesting since it is only from Kandal that we have reports of propaganda cadre referring to him as head of the KK. This could possibly indicate some intra-party struggle for power. In 1970, along with Hou Youn and Hu Nim, who are from the Kampot-Takeo-Kampong Speu area, Samphan was one of the three most important ministers in Sihanouk's first cabinet in the newly-formed Royal United National Front Government. Several months later Sihanouk announced that Samphan had been made Deputy Prime Minister, also retaining his National Defense portfolio. Ironically, Samphan in 1967 had led an abortive Khmer Rouge revolt against Sihanouk in Battambang Province and the Prince had sentenced him to death.\textsuperscript{7} END NOTE.

In early Svay Rieng Province, which like Prey Veng is in KC Military Region 203, the KK also tried to disassociate themselves from Sihanouk but in this case ran into difficulties. Around the end of 1972 the KK began publicly disavowing the Prince's leadership saying that he had deserted the revolution and was taking 100,000 riels a month from the
party's coffers to live a fast life in Peking, while the people were left to fight and die in Cambodia. Propaganda teams were sent to villages to spread this message and proclaim the party supreme, but this provoked spontaneous demonstrations by the populace on Sihanouk's behalf. The KK quickly changed their approach: they declared that, although Sihanouk had committed some errors, he had apologized to the people and the party and so was again leader of the anti-GKR forces. However, the KK cadre also now added that when Sihanouk returns it will be as a private citizen and not as a Prince. Privately, however, the KK do not recognize Sihanouk's authority and state they are just using his popularity to placate the population. This is openly stated at meetings of KK cadre. At party headquarters, all references to, and pictures of, the Prince are forbidden.

In summary, the Khmer Liberation Front, composed of the Khmer Krahom and the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdoah, has apparently broken down in at least parts of Kampot, Takeo, Kandal, and Svay Rieng Provinces, with the KK emerging as the dominant force. This breakdown seems due to conscious and deliberate KK effort to disassociate themselves from Sihanouk and undermine his popular legitimacy. This split has occurred throughout the three KC military regions in which these four provinces are located, suggesting centrally-directed policy imposed on lower echelons from above. However, on the other hand, the Military Region 405 Commander has attempted to reconcile the two factions, indicating central support for unity rather than division. This suggests that the split may be merely a local aberration occurring only in the border areas and not a national policy. Another--and more likely--possibility is that, in addition to the combined KLF (KR and KK) military chain of command, there is a separate Khmer Krahom (i.e., Communist Party) command structure which is issuing orders independently of the KLF. In other words, while the KLF may be issuing orders trying to unify the organization, separate orders may be emanating from Khmer Krahom central headquarters telling their province chairmen to disregard the front at the local level. This could explain their continued cooperation in attacking Phnom Penh while at province level and below they are at each other's throats.

In either event, in the areas along the SVN border, where they predominate, the KK have significantly departed from KLF policies and have instituted a series of policies and programs designed to change Khmer Society from a traditional one to a communist one. A detailed description of these efforts constitutes the remainder of this paper.
3. The Communication Process

This section is devoted to a description of the policies, programs and institutions the KK have utilized in their effort to communize society in southern Cambodia. Emphasis will be on structural-functional definition rather than historical continuity and, therefore, while some references will be made to when certain phenomena occurred or began, there is no time sequence relationship implied by the order in which various subjects are treated. The KK communization process can be broken down into the following categories, each of which is a major subject heading within this section: Governmental-Administrative; Political-Psychological; Socio-Religious-Cultural; Military; and Economic.

The reader should note at this point that the communization process has not occurred at a uniform rate throughout the entire border area. Villages which the KK have controlled since mid-1970 such as those in Kampot are much further along than those in Takeo and Kandal, taken over in 1973. We have taken most of the examples from Kampong Trach District of Kampot because communization has been most extensively carried out there.

Governmental-Administrative

Levels of Government: We are aware of seven levels of government within the Party Government of the United National Front. They are: central; region; area; district; village; hamlet; and inter-family group. We have little information regarding the operations of the central and regional level of the KK government other than the basic organizational setup at region, the numerical designations of the regions, and the boundaries of the regions in the area under discussion (see Map at Attachment A and Table of Organization at Attachment B). There are three KC military regions bordering on SVN between Ha Tien City and the eastern boundary of Kien Phong Province: MR 405, MR 607 and MR 203.1 MR 405 includes Government of Khmer Republic (GKR) Takeo and Kampot Provinces; MR 607 includes GKR Kandal Province; and MR 203 includes GKR Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. These military regions are subdivided into KK areas (provinces) which, as mentioned above, have numbers instead of names. GKR Kampot Province is known as Area 35, GKR Takeo Province is Area 13, GKR Kandal Province is Area 25, GKR Prey Veng Province is Area 24 and GKR Svay Rieng Province is Area 23. Each area is comprised of districts, which also have numerical designations. Those involved in this study have the following numbers: Kampong Trach District of GKR Kampot Province is District 77 of Area 35; Banteay Meas District of GKR Kampot Province is District 75 of Area 35; Angkor Chey District of GKR
Kampot Province is District 106 of Area 13; Kaoh Andet District of GKR Takeo Province is District 108 of Area 13; Kirivong District of GKR Takeo Province is District 109 of Area 13. We do not have designations for Kaoh Thom and Leuk Dek Districts of GKR Kandal Province (Area 25) or Prey Krabas District of GKR Takeo Province (Area 13).

Below the district level of government are found the village and hamlet governments—which have retained their traditional names—and the newly instituted inter-family groups.

Staffing Patterns: Sources differ on the staffing patterns of these levels of government. For example, (FDP 6029) indicates that district governments in Kampot Province consist of only four men: a chief, a deputy, a head of the economic section, and a military affairs man. (FVA 4574) however, says the district table of organization includes five staff members—a political cadre, an economic chief, a crop production man, a propaganda chief, and a security head man—in addition to a chairman and deputy. Tables of organization indicating most of the probable positions at each level of government are at Attachments C, D, E, F, and G.

Village/Hamlet Government: As stated above, district governments were established by the KLF right after it was formed in March 1970. The Front then organized village and hamlet elections. The first of which we know occurred in District 77 (Kampong Trach District) in late May 1970 shortly after the departure of the GKR troops and civilian cadre. In each village an assembly was first called and chaired by three KLF cadre from the district administration who announced the establishment of a new government which would be constituted through elections. They then called for volunteers to run for the post of village chairman and a secret ballot election was immediately held with each villager casting a single vote. The candidate with a plurality won. All of the candidates were local residents and none were members of the KK (i.e., Communist Party). The newly-elected village chief was empowered to select the remainder of his staff: a deputy, secretary, economic commissioner, cultural commissioner, and health and social welfare commissioner.

The above election process is repeated at the hamlet level to elect a chairman, who, in turn, appoints a deputy and economic member, the two men who comprise his total staff. Each hamlet also maintains a 12-man military unit as does the village, in addition to a two-man police force. In each case, the militia answers to the chairman but is under day-to-day control of the deputy. This represents the total staff of the village.
and the hamlet, all of which is under the authority of the chairman. There is no separate party existence, nor are there political cadre at the village level or at any level below. Other reports indicate that in areas which were taken over in 1973, after the KK had renounced Sihanouk and had entered their accelerated communization campaign, village and hamlet officials were appointed by district level officials, usually from a group of low-level KK cadre.

The lowest level of government is that of the inter-family group, which comprises from 12 to 15 families headed by a group chairman picked by the hamlet chief. In addition to the chairman, each group has a deputy and one committee man. The inter-family group is one of the KK's most important means of carrying out its propaganda. Its functions will be discussed below.

While the staffing of these three bottom levels of government is usually a non-party matter, the exact opposite obtains at the district level where membership in the KK seems a prerequisite to candidacy for the two elected positions--Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the District Committee. The election of these two officers--which first occurred in early 1972 in Kampong Trach District--was done from a pre-selected list of only two candidates. The electorate was made up of three officials from each village, each of whom was allowed to freely cast an individual secret ballot. The winner became the chairman and the loser the deputy.

It is also at the district level that the first party political cadre or commissar is found. Organizationally, this man is referred to as the Deputy District Chairman for Political and Military Affairs (Snon Kana Yobai Yothea Srok), but, in fact, he is equal in authority to the district chairman, sitting as a co-equal at meetings. He is, in reality, more powerful because he directly controls the 300-man district military force. He is not elected and holds his government position entirely through the Front (Party). This, then, is the first instance in which a separation between governmental and party lines of authority is found.

Population Control: One of the first steps taken by the newly-founded KK government was to introduce a system of passes and travel permits throughout Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces. These are intended to
greatly restrict personal movement and to prevent flight and illegal trading by local residents and penetration by outsiders. The police and militia are constantly patrolling and checking travelers' paperwork, so the system is rigidly enforced. Generally, movement within the village is free and no pass is required, although in some instances where rice fields are somewhat distant from towns, persons are given passes to go and tend their crops. In these cases usually only one family member is allowed to go.\(^1\) To leave one's village, it is necessary to procure a travel permit which only the village chief or, in his absence, his deputy can issue. A written or verbal certification of the legitimacy of the request from one's hamlet chief to the village chief is a necessary prerequisite. Once issued, such permits are valid only for travel within the district and for three days.\(^2\)

The District Secretary must authorize travel outside the district. His permission can be requested in person or in writing through the village office. Endorsement by the village chief of the necessity of this travel is an established pre-condition. Fifteen and 30-day passes may be obtained for travel outside the province but these can be granted only by province-level officials who receive such requests only through district offices and never from citizens directly.\(^3\) A written endorsement of the need for this travel from all lower echelons of government must accompany such requests.

Violations of these rules—i.e., traveling without a permit—can result in arrest and punishment. For the first two offenses a person is given seven and 14 days at hard labor at the district level. A third offense usually brings a six-month stint in the province jail (which in Kampong Trach is a malaria-ridden camp that few people survive). Should one commit a fourth violation, a village assembly is called at which KK district cadre explain to the people that the offender has not responded to previous training and, therefore, is being taken to a high-level re-education center where he will be given extensive long-term instruction on how to comply with the law. Such people are never seen again and are allegedly executed.\(^4\)

Party cadre, on the other hand, receive mission orders from the province-level government which are good for one year and allow them to move freely about the province.
Governmental Offices: The KK party government maintains a series of administrative offices at village, district and province level at which travel permits and other type paperwork may be processed. These are referred to as Open Offices (Monty Chomho). At the village level, the entire government operates out of the Village Open Office (Monty Chomho Khum). (Note: Since the KK burned down most of the old village offices, present administrations have been forced to locate in private houses. In most villages in Kampong Trach there is no office, no flag and not even a sign.) All government officials including the police and militia can be contacted there. This is not so at the District Open Office (Monty Chomho Srok) where only the district secretary with the official stamp and a few bodyguards are present to carry on public business. The remainder of the district government and party is located in a secret zone. While the public may come to the District Open Office to conduct business, they may not go to the Area (Province) Open Office (Monty Chomho Dumbon) which is accessible only to district cadre and officials, who take all necessary paperwork to it. The remainder of the province government exists in a separate secret zone. Hamlet governments and inter-family groups do not maintain offices, operating out of the home of the chairman.

Inspections and Visits: KK cadre maintain control over, and liaison with subordinate echelons through a series of overt visits and inspections to villages and hamlets. The District Chairman and the Deputy for Political and Military Affairs sometimes stay in villages four or five days, thoroughly inspecting the implementation of all programs. Other functional specialists visit, too, especially before any new program or policy is inaugurated. Finally, several times each month propaganda and other cadre come to conduct village assemblies and propaganda sessions.

Secret Police: Another means of maintaining control over the population is through a secret police organization. Little is known about the operation of this force, except that it exists only at district level and above and its members' identities are unknown to village-level officials and the population.

Political and Psychological Control

While administrative control is exercised through the apparatus described above, the KK also have programs designed to mobilize the population and to mold individuals into "useful and productive" members of society. The devices
used to accomplish this are: membership in people's associations; mass propaganda meetings; intensive training; re-education through work; re-education through confinement; and terror. While only a few details of the theory behind this process are available, it is known that the KK have set up a standard of evaluating the degree to which certain communities have been indoctrinated. Under this rating system, people who have just come under KK control and have had little political training are called Sa Dan (phonetic) while those who have been receiving propaganda and training regularly for over a year are referred to as Bet Tra Lop (phonetic). It is not known whether this is a purely local phenomenon or part of a nationally-directed rating scheme which outlines various procedures to be carried out at each level of political training. (Note: Can Tho A-116 observed that Viet Cong treatment of the population in areas it controls in SVN varied with the length of time they had been in charge. In newly-"liberated" areas they dealt with the population much less strictly than after a year of control. This also seems to be the case in KK areas which may indicate that such categorization and corresponding training methods are part of a general communist theory of psychological and political retraining.)

People's Associations: In addition to breaking the population down into inter-family groups based on the geographic location of their homes, the KK also organize villagers according to sex, age and occupation. The standard pattern seems to be for every village to have a: children's association; a young men's association; young girl's association; women's association; married men's association; and farmers' association. KK associations, like hamlets, have a three-man command structure: chairman, deputy, and committeeman. The chairman is elected. The purposes of these organizations vary. The children's association seems to be mainly a study and play club which in some locales is called the Patriotic Youth Movement. Some of the themes reportedly emphasized in these study sessions are "Khmer Independence" and "Cambodia for Cambodians". All other associations engage in more practical activities, with some of them having their own rice fields and garden plots. In some villages,
the associations are called upon to help guard the hamlets. This occurred in Kampot and Takeo Provinces and in areas of Kandal Province inhabited by Cham people, where even the young girls' associations were required to act as guards. This rule greatly upset the Chams whose custom is to shield young unmarried girls from contact with the public. People's associations are also involved in fund and food-raising campaigns and have an important role to play in the intensive training program. Both are discussed below.

However, while these associations have certain functions to perform, it must be emphasized they are not within the KK administrative chain of command (which goes through the hamlet chief and inter-family group chief) and are not used in the implementation of important programs. For example, when the KK sought to organize and conduct "popular demonstrations" against the VC/NVA in Kampong Trach District, the population was mobilized and brought to the demonstration area through orders given through the hamlet and inter-family group chiefs and not the people's associations. Also, as will be seen later in the paper, the KK employed this same chain of command to collectivize agriculture and relocate large segments of the population--two of their most important programs. Thus, the associations must be understood to have a primarily political and psychological role and not an administrative one.

One final word is necessary for a full appreciation and understanding of these popular associations and inter-family groups. They are not novel creations of the KK, nor are they unique experiments in administrative control. Such organizations have existed in other Southeast Asian countries, even relatively free ones such as South Vietnam, for years. The differences lie in how they are used. In SVN inter-family groups provide a loose but reasonably effective means of keeping track of where people are and signalling the presence of strangers. In KK-controlled areas of Cambodia they perform that function but also provide the mechanism for forcing the population to carry out a whole series of radically new programs. A comparison of people's associations in the two countries yields roughly the same conclusion. Thus, while structurally these organizations are extremely similar in these two countries, their uses are quite different.

Nocturnal Assemblies: The most prevalent form of indoctrination is the night propaganda session, of which two types have been discerned. The first type is a village assembly to which every family must send one representative, and which are usually chaired by several KK cadre from district level. The meeting's two main purposes seem to be to inform
the population about KK policies and programs and to answer questions about them. In Kampong Trach, where the KK have had control for three years, such meetings are held twice each month but attendance is usually limited to those families who live near the village center. Hamlet chiefs are expected to attend and to carry the message back to their constituencies. In more recently-controlled areas, reports indicate that the entire village must attend lectures on such basic subjects as the principles of communist doctrine, people's war, and increased farm production.

The second type of night-time meeting is somewhat more complex and involves the participation of the people's associations. Essentially, it is a response to a call for support for the army or for families of KK soldiers and involves donations of food and/or money. In some places it is called the Family Support Movement and in others the ceremony to "Uplift Your Spirit to Support the Committee" (Smaraday Phnak Rolek Upathon Anghar).

In this latter type, a drive would typically begin several days before the ceremony when the village chairman would receive an order from district to raise food and money. He would then contact the chairmen of the associations and inform them of these new requirements. They, in turn, would hold a meeting of their associations to settle the details of obtaining the needed commodities. Finally, a night-time pageant-like ceremony is held, at a pagoda, at which each member of each association comes forth and presents his contribution. These donations may be one or two liters of rice, a chicken, some fruit, or 10-20 riels. These are usually happy events with large numbers of children present and much singing of "revolutionary" songs. The theme is participation through an association in the revolutionary cause of the party.

**Intensive Political Training:** One of the main targets of this KK effort politically and psychologically to reshape Khmer society is youth. To this end, the KK have begun a program of intensive political training for young men and women which involves taking them from their home hamlets to remote indoctrination centers for a period of two to three weeks. This program exists in all three Cambodian border provinces. While we have no information about the nature and content of this training, it seems to
by achieving significant results. According to all accounts, young boys and girls (age 16-18) returning from these sessions: are fierce in their condemnation of religion and the "old ways"; reject parental authority; are passionate in their loyalty to the state and party; are critical and contemptuous of customs; and have a militant attitude which expresses confidence in mechanical weapons and rejects the mystical aspects of religion.\(^1\) In Kampong Trach, these youths were charged with teaching other youths in their home hamlets. Further, although they still live at home, almost all have stopped working the family plot of land and instead work directly for the youth association on its land.\(^2\) The association thus becomes a new and real point of identification for the youth, at least partially replacing the family. Therefore, it seems possible to conclude that the KK view these associations as an indispensable part of the process of psychologically restructuring Khmer society, which constitute, along with this intensive political training, a major attack on the family, one of the major elements of traditional Cambodian society.

Re-Education Through Work: In addition to its efforts to influence group behavior, the KK also seek to mold and reshape Khmer society through re-education of specific individuals. This process seems to be used to "socially level" certain persons who had been members of the bourgeois class under the previous regime. For instance, in Kampot, a university student was forced to plant and harvest rice so that he would develop a worker's mentality. In another case, a wealthy Chinese woman had all her property confiscated and was forced to tend the pigs in her commune.\(^3\) Another example is from Kandal Province, where everyone regardless of previous work experience or status is assigned tasks within a local agricultural commune. KK cadre there openly explain that this is done to re-educate each individual as to his role as a member of society and to obliterate any class lines.\(^4\)

Re-Education Through Confinement: In addition to those who still have bourgeois mentalities, there are others who need to be socially re-adjusted. For those who break rules or in other ways show themselves to be "anti-social", there is a system of confinement and hard labor designed to correct this. The types and degrees of punishment were described above in the section on travel permits and need not be elaborated on again here except to point out that this is an integral part of the total process of reshaping society. It exists in all three provinces and applies to a variety of regulations and not only travel permits.\(^5\)
Terror and Punishment: The final KK method for cowing and molding the population is terror. Harsh punishment is widespread, with reports of it emanating from every province. Death sentences are relatively common although public executions are not the rule. Usually people are arrested and simply never show up again, or are given six months in jail and then die there. Crimes which ordinarily merit this treatment are: fleeing from areas of KK control; questioning or speaking against KK policies; and espionage for FANK and the GKR (a canard under which a multitude of other offenses are grouped). Some specific examples:

-- "Many" people in the Tuk Meas-Banteay Meas area had "vanished during the night" after questioning certain aspects of the KK forced relocation program. They were never seen again and to this day their families do not know what happened to them.

-- The Russei Srok Village Chief said six rich but innocent persons in his village were accused of being FANK spies, arrested and taken to the Kampot Province jail, northwest of Kampong Trach town, where they either died of malaria or were executed. He also said that some people who sold cows in defiance of a KK order were sent to this jail and have not been seen again.

-- (FDP 6151) states that anyone opposing KK rice confiscation in Svay Rieng Province was tortured.

-- (FVA 4716, FVS 32761) and other sources report that anyone fleeing KK areas—-even to avoid the heavy KC-NVA fighting—was shot on the spot.

-- Throughout 1973, a number of Cambodians and Chinese were arrested in Banteay Meas and Kampong Trach Districts under pretext of being FANK agents, taken to the Kampot (Area 35) prison, and executed.

-- In the Cham hamlets of Kandal Province, inter-family group chairmen were told they would be shot if anyone from their group turned up missing.

-- (FDP 6588) reports that ten people were publicly executed in Tuol Kupos Village (VT 430143) Kampot Province in January 1974 for opposing KK policies.
In November 1973, two recalcitrant monks were reportedly tortured to death with pick axes at two separate pagodas in Takeo Province because KK cadre believed they had sent all the younger monks to SVN to escape going in the army.  

A campaign was carried out in Tuk Meas, Sre Chea and Chuuk towns: everyone from village guard to village chief who had served in the Sihanouk Government was to be arrested and shot. At least ten men are known to have been taken to the Area 35 jail and executed.

In other instances, punishments have not been quite so harsh. One Cham religious leader who questioned a KK directive regulating Cham women's hairstyles received only three months in a district jail. Other Chams who continue to wear their customary colorful clothing despite a KK ban have their clothing painted black, if it is a first offense. For a second offense, the penalty is three days loss of food ration, and for a third time, three months in jail.

An additional note seems necessary about the Kampot Province (Area 35) jail. It is located in a barren and desolate part of Kampot by a mountain noted for malaria. Few reportedly survive even three months at the mountain, and fear of being sent there is great. Since even seemingly minor offenses—such as the failure to secure a travel permit—can result in six months incarceration in the area jail, the penalty for such offense, in effect, is death. For this reason, there is strict adherence to even the most minor rules. We have no report of similarly harsh jails in either Takeo or Kandal Provinces.

Fear then seems obviously a key ingredient both in insuring the smooth operation of the KK Government and in controlling the population. Even though no member of the government at the village level and below is a party member, all orders are exactly carried out, because officials fear the consequences if they do not. Fear has also cowed the population, Refugees at Tan Khanh Hoa, as well as Cham refugees in Chau Doc City told ConGen officers that fear of arrest and execution was so great that no one dared speak critically of a KK policy—even in his own home—lest he be overheard and turned in by a neighbor. This indicates that in addition to suppressing dissent, KK terror also seems to aim at atomizing society—i.e., breaking down traditional social and communal bonds and leaving individuals alone to face the state. People afraid to speak even to their neighbors and close friends, such as those listed above, are seemingly far along in this process.
Military Organization

Military or para-military units are organized and controlled at the hamlet, village, district, and area (province) levels of government. We have no information about the regional and central levels. At area level, the army is organized into battalions (Kongvereas) and special companies which come under the direct control of the Province Military Affairs Committee Chairman.¹ These are full-time local force units which are thoroughly trained and have first priority on available equipment and weaponry. Their main mission has been to conduct operations against FANK, NVA and VC units. The status of district level units is less clear. As mentioned above, the troops are directly controlled by the Deputy District Chairman for Military and Political Affairs and seem to have as their mission defending the district from outside attack, protecting the district office and district officials, controlling the population, and enforcing unpopular political decisions. As an example of the latter, it was these district units which supported the KK relocation program by coming to each hamlet and forcing people to pack up and move.² However, while they are armed and seem to be active on a full-time basis, there is some question about the amount of training these units have had. According to some sources, the district militia is actually only a lightly-trained aggregation of guerrillas who have been recruited from the village militia.³ In fact, in Kampong Trach District, the district force is called the District Patrol (Chlop Srok) just as the village force is called the Village Patrol (Chlop Khum) indicating they are of like nature.⁴ These district units vary in size, running anywhere from 60 to 300 men.⁵ In Kampong Trach, the basic organizational unit of the district force is a platoon of 50 men which is called a "group of 50".

At the village level, there is a permanent force of about 12-15 men, usually armed with SKS and CKC rifles, who are directly under the command of the deputy village chairman and whose mission is to: provide security for the village office and village officials; control movement by the population; provide security against outside attack; and support police operations.⁶ These police operations are carried out by the village policemen who are older and have more authority than the village patrol. In Russel Srok Village there were two such policemen who came under the direct control of the village chairman and who were purely concerned with police matters, having no political function.
Below the village level, there is a hamlet militia which may or may not be armed (perhaps indicating that a hamlet must reach a certain stage of development before the KK are willing to trust the people with weapons. If so, this would confirm the earlier point regarding KK distinctions among various levels of political development). All boys from age 16, (in some areas 14) must join the militia and undergo basic training. As indicated above, in some areas girls are required to join this force and actually stand guard. In hamlets where weapons are issued, a more permanent unit of 12 men is established. Usually only three weapons are issued and the members stand guard and patrol the roads in the hamlet day and night in groups of four on a rotational basis. In this case, the remainder of the hamlet youth (i.e., besides the basic 12) form a ready reserve from which replacements can be drawn. Adults are also involved but to a lesser degree. Since the KK view the current struggle as a total people's war which involves every citizen, they conduct a series of night training sessions for everyone in the hamlet during which the principles of people's war and duties of individual citizens are carefully explained.

All of these levels of military organization—from area battalion to hamlet reserve—are theoretically linked together and, as needs arise, the KK may draw on already trained replacements from lower echelons. For instance, should an area province-level battalion need replacements, it orders the districts to send forward the requisite number of men. The district draws these men from its local force company, thus providing the province men with some military experience. To make up for its losses, the district levies a requirement on the villages to send forward men from their militia; the village, in turn, draws replacements from its hamlet patrols. The hamlet, finally, inducts youth, who have had only the briefest introduction to military affairs, into its unit and starts them on a basic program of learning weapon care and proficiency and gaining practical experience through patrolling and standing guard.

Although this is the way the system was intended to work, there are indications that due to the lack of low-level organization and the heavy losses suffered by some KC main force units, in some areas the KK have had to resort to a program of direct induction to reinforce its major units. In Kandal Province the KK attempted to recruit 4,000 men in September (1973) alone. In nearby Prey Veng Province, a stepped-up recruiting campaign was ordered whereby each village was to raise a 400-man unit, utilizing girls if sufficient men and boys were not available. In Kampot, the KK resorted to drafting monks. A more complete description of this is given below.
Socio-Religious-Cultural

The KK also instituted a series of policies aimed at the reformation of religion, marriage, and certain customs and mores. Some of these, such as the prohibition on certain types of dress and attacks on family authority, have been alluded to above.

Marriage: The KK have attempted to change marriage in two ways: by raising the minimum age and by removing much of the pomp and ceremony surrounding it. In both Kandal and Kampot provinces the minimum marriage age has been raised to 25 for a male and 21 for female.1 In Kampot, the KK explained that scientific research has shown that marriage prior to this age is unhealthy and, therefore, they are only following sound medical practice in setting up these new minimum ages. In Kandal, the KK use the more pragmatic explanation that all efforts should be devoted to the war and, therefore, all marriages will have to wait until it is over. In addition, the KK have forbidden the holding of elaborate wedding pageants and ceremonies which were the Cambodian and Cham custom. This prohibition will go into effect, presumably if and when marriages start taking place again.2

Ceremonies, Dances, Holidays and Songs: The KK have also undertaken to limit the numbers of holidays, holy days and ceremonies and change their character by forbidding traditional dances, and rewriting popular and folk songs. All of this is decreed and implemented through the system of cultural committees of the province, district and village governments. No ceremony of any type can be held in any part of a village without the prior approval of this committee. Traditional dancing has been totally forbidden as is the singing of religious and folk songs. The cultural committee has replaced the latter with new revolutionary songs, which are sung only at such appropriate events as night propaganda sessions and "Uplift Your Spirit..." ceremonies.4 Holy days and holidays have been reduced to only two--Cambodian New Year and Pchum Band, which occurs in September.5 The manner of celebration has also changed. Whereas previously these occasions called for houses to be colorfully decorated throughout every hamlet, now only one central celebration is allowed in each village, usually at the pagoda.6 Religious and national festivals of ethnic and religious minorities have been totally forbidden and former participants forced to attend the two Cambodian celebrations listed above.7 Buddhist religious ceremonies are also forbidden, although the pagodas have not been closed to individual use.8
Religion: Perhaps the most significant socio-cultural reformation the KK have attempted is an attack on religion in general and the Theravada Buddhist Church and clergy in particular. Some aspects of this policy have been discussed above: the program for intensive political training for youth which reportedly instills in them a disdain for things religious and a substitution of faith in the revolution for faith in Buddha and Allah; the prohibition against practically all religious ceremonies; the conduct of civic and political meetings and celebrations in religious edifices; and a ban on traditional dancing and religious songs. While deprecating the value of religion, the KK have not forced Theravada Buddhist pagodas to close. They are still open to any of the faithful who wish to visit and pray. This, however, is not the case in Cham areas in Kandal Province. There the practice of the Islamic religion has been totally forbidden, Muslims are forced to attend ceremonies at Buddhist pagodas. Also, local KK cadre constantly threaten to destroy all mosques by the end of 1974. The Muslim Chams represent only a small minority and a small part of this effort.

The major part of the KK program to reform religion has been aimed at undercutting the influence and authority of the clergy of the Buddhist Church—the monks—through the following measures: setting up a government-controlled monks' association; forcing the monks to perform manual labor; inducting them into the army; stripping them of their robes and honorific titles; arresting uncooperative monks and sending them for re-education; and replacing old chief monks with new ones sympathetic to KK aims.

This attack on the monks began in May 1973 and was initially limited to forcing the monks to perform manual labor. In some cases, they had only to begin farming the cultivable land around their pagoda so they would be "productive members of the community earning their way." In other cases, monks were forced to shed their robes and form labor gangs to work on road projects. A general prohibition against addressing monks by their honorific title was also put into effect. Despite KK propaganda that every man must fight and that the monks, who have heretofore been non-productive members of society, must now contribute their fair share, this policy met with resistance not only from the monks themselves but from the population.
In June 1973, the KK undertook two measures designed to overcome this resistance: the establishment of a KK-controlled monks' association and the forced re-education of a large number of monks. The monks' associations, headed by new young monks (about 30 years old), replaced the traditional religious Sangha organization led by elderly monks. These new monks were friendly to the KK cause and in some cases had received political training. Each pagoda was also reorganized into an association with an elected chairman and deputy—reportedly carefully screened by the KK before being allowed to stand for election—with remaining monks divided up into three-man cells. The new chief monk then visited each association (pagoda) explaining the new regime and outlining the following duties for each monk: explain the KK revolution and objectives through lectures to the population and urge support for them; assist at all hamlet level propaganda activities; assist in relocating villages; help collect money; encourage refugees in SVN to return; and serve in the army if required. Many monks reacted against these policies and in July, when the first letter came out requiring each pagoda to supply ten monks for the army, a number of older monks encouraged their younger draft-age colleagues to flee to SVN. To overcome this opposition, the KK established a re-education center in September at Sre Chea near Kampong Trach and brought 200 recalcitrant monks there for training. Their daily regimen consisted of: propaganda sessions devoted to condemnation of Lon Nol as a US puppet; explanations of KK policy; and work on a common agricultural plot. The monks were told that, if they agreed to support the KK and follow party instructions, they would be allowed to return to their pagodas. Some of the monks adamantly refused to go along with the KK. One old ex-chief monk, who has been particularly obstinate has been detained at Sre Chea for a total of eight months starting even before the opening of the re-education center. As noted above in the section on terror, two monks were tortured to death in the Tuk Meas area for refusal to support KK policies of this type.

At the same time, they were implementing this program, the KK began inducting monks into the army on a large scale in Kampot and Takeo Provinces (indicating, as noted above, that their regular military draft program was not providing enough front lines replacements). This policy allowed each pagoda to keep four monks: the rest had to join the army. Many monks fled: of the estimated 500 monks in
Kampong Trach District, 200 sought refuge in GKR-held Kampot City. Most did not escape, however, and over 1,000 were inducted from Banteay Meas, Kampong Trach and Chuuk Districts, so that by September 1973 there were only a few monks left in each pagoda in these districts. Once in the army, the monks were formed into two battalions lettered B and F which were led by regular officers from Area 35 (Kampot Province). These two battalions received only light training and then were thrown into the battle for Kep City, where they reportedly suffered heavy casualties.

In summary, by the end of 1973 the KK had made significant progress in its attack on religion. It had greatly limited the number of holy days; changed religious celebrations to fit civil needs; outlawed religious song and dance; prohibited practice of the Islamic religion; decimated the monk population in Kampot and Takeo Provinces; reduced their presence in pagodas to a minimal number; and undermined the traditional system of monastic authority by establishing a new monks' association and substituting "reliable" monks for recalcitrant ones, who were removed from their pagodas and sent to be re-educated.

Austerity: A final KK social reform has been a forced austerity program. The prohibition against Cham people in Kandal Province wearing their customary colorful dress, discussed above, also applies to Cambodians. Since mid-1972, ethnic Khmers have been forbidden to wear the traditional multi-colored sarong in Kampot and Takeo Provinces. Also forbidden is the wearing of elaborate veils, unusual hairdos, and all types of costume jewelry. Instead, everyone is supposed to wear plain black shirts and trousers and let their hair fall naturally. This latter part is particularly bothersome to Cham women, who wear their hair up for customary (rather than seductive) reasons. Another austerity measure has been a ban on drinking commercial alcohol or beer, and smoking manufactured cigarettes. Locally-made palm wine and roll-your-own tobacco and papers are still available, but Phnom Penh beer and cigarettes abundant until 1971 can no longer be found. All these austerity measures are designed to reflect the hardships of the war-time situation, as well as to do away with frivolous, non-productive, unnecessary habits.
Economic Reformation

The final major way in which the KK have sought to reshape Khmer society has been the communization and collectivization of the economy. This has involved the following programs: land redistribution; establishment of cooperative stores; strict regulation of trading and commercial activity; collectivized harvests; mass relocations of the population; taxation; economic leveling; common ownership of the agricultural means of production; and communication of the distribution process. Each of these is discussed in detail below.

Economic Leveling: The KK program of economic leveling--reducing the amount of material possessions of some so that all citizens have roughly the same degree of wealth--is discussed initially because it is one of the first steps the KK take when they gain control of a village. The prohibition against fancy dress and the wearing of jewelry has already been discussed. A second and major part of the process is the confiscation of mechanized transportation--Hondas and motorized sampans. In Kampong Trach these were simply expropriated by the district government, though cadre did tell owners their boats were just being borrowed and, in fact, did return a few to their owners. In Kandal Province, this same process was accomplished through a system of confiscatory taxation which will be discussed later. Additionally, a more encompassing confiscation of valuable material goods took place during the relocation of some hamlets. In these instances people were allowed only to take a few necessities and were forced to abandon their houses, furniture, and family heirlooms which KK cadre then collected. This sometimes led to tragedy. In one case, an eldest son was shot dead while trying to protect his family's home in Takeo. In a few others, people reportedly committed suicide rather than face the loss of their possessions. In other cases, household goods were not taken. In Kampong Trach District, for instance, people had to abandon their houses but could take with them any possessions they could carry.

Finally, economic leveling was also accomplished through the land redistribution program which is discussed next.

Land Redistribution: This, too, is one of the first programs the KK implement after they enter a village. It seems designed, along with the other measures just described to signal an abrupt halt to the "old ways" and to act as an immediate initiation into the new system and a preparation for the future which will eventually involve complete
collectivization and communization of agriculture. While some type of land reform has taken place in all three provinces, the methods have differed slightly. In Kampong Trach, where the program was carried out in all villages in 1972, no person was allowed to retain over five hectares of rice land or one hectare of garden land or orchard. Rice land over that limit was given to people with fewer than five hectares or to people's associations in the village. Orchards and garden land were not redistributed but kept under district government control. In Kandal, where rice land is less abundant, all land was confiscated and then parcelled out, with each family getting one hectare.

Taxation: The question of the nature and extent of KK taxation remains unclear. In Kandal Province, there is a still monthly "tax" on items such as household furniture, Hondas and motorized sampans. After several months, most people can no longer afford to continue to pay the tax and seek to sell these items. The only buyer is the government cooperative store, which pays only a fraction of goods' real worth. In effect, this system seems part of the economic leveling process, accomplishing the same result as the policy of outright confiscation used in Kampong Trach. Similar reports from nearby Svay Rieng Province suggest that the KK there are confiscating rice or buying it through forced sale. This has been referred to as a tax but is most likely another form of economic leveling—intended for short term rather than recurring use. Thus, while these KK revenue collection incidents may have appeared as tax collections to those who had to pay them, they do not seem to constitute a tax system in the usual sense of the word. Moreover, in Kampong Trach and Kampot Provinces there are no reports of direct taxation (assuming, of course, that land confiscation is considered something other than a tax). For example, people selling produce and livestock at KK cooperatives may keep the entire proceeds of their sale. The report that no direct taxes are collected in Kampong Trach along with the evidence from Kandal and Svay Rieng leads us to the tentative conclusion that there is not now a regular system of domestic direct taxation in KK areas.

There is evidence which suggests the existence of a series of import taxes which are levied on merchants entering Cambodia or KK zones of control. Moreover, a customs point may exist in southern Kandal Province near the SVN border. Little is known, though, of its operation or the rates of taxation.
Collectivization of Agriculture: There are two systems of collectivization, both of which are carried out through the administrative mechanism of the inter-family group. In the first system, which appears to be used as an introductory step toward total communization, families retain individual responsibility (ownership?) for planting and caring for a particular piece of rice land, but they harvest collectively. This procedure was put in to effect simultaneously with the land redistribution program in Kampong Trach District and Kandal Province where each family received an individual plot of land. Under this arrangement, each family was responsible for buying seed, plowing, planting, hoeing, and weeding its own tract. However, at harvest time, all members of the inter-family group formed a joint crew which moved from plot to plot cutting, threshing, and collecting paddy which was then moved to a central storage point, usually at the home of the inter-family group chairman. Once the harvest was completed, the group chairman distributed rice to each family based on a formula which allowed each person an equal amount of rice per day. Estimates of how much rice each person is allowed vary, perhaps due to the differences in the size of the harvest in different locales. In some places, the ration was reportedly only 250 grams per day, while in others it was 600-700. Enough rice was to be retained to feed everyone in the group until the next harvest and the remainder sold to the village government, which forwarded it to the district for use by the army or to feed other groups whose harvest was insufficient. Such groups must initiate a request through their hamlet chairman to the village chairman requesting such rice, which is given without charge. Money made by any inter-family group from the sale of excess rice is kept by the chairman to pay for any special needs of the group or any member, such as special medicine or certain types of farm equipment.

In the second type of collectivization system, land is held in common by the inter-family group and families do not have responsibility for any particular section of it. The entire process of rice production is done in common, from plowing to harvest. Distribution remains the same as in the first system. In Kampot Province, these fully-collectivized farm communes were established in all areas in which people were resettled. They were also set up in certain villages of Svay Rieng Province. In Kampot, the KK introduced new farming methods to the people in the communes, such as the use of fertilizer and insecticides and techniques for building bigger and more effective dikes. As a result, production has outstripped previous individual efforts. Some of these improvements have also been introduced in Kandal Province.
Garden lands and orchards over one hectare in size have also been collectivized. The District Crop Production Committee takes direct charge of these assets, assigns people to work them, and expropriates the entire crop.

Other farm activities have been brought under strict regulation, but have not been collectivized. Individual families are still allowed to own chickens, pigs, cattle, and other livestock but cannot freely dispose of them. Cattle, water buffalo and other large animals can be killed and sold only with permission of the district government and then only to one of the district cooperative stores. Chickens, pigs, ducks and other smaller animals can be slaughtered without permission and sold either in one's own village market, or to the district cooperative but nowhere else. This prohibition is enforced through a system of permits. Anyone wishing to move livestock or any commodity to a cooperative must have a paper issued by his village chairman listing the items he is allowed to buy and sell. Roving bands of local militia insure compliance.

Cooperative Stores and Control of Trade: As indicated above, the KK have moved to gain complete control of trade both within their society and with areas outside it. Their main tools have been strict regulation of all movement into, out of, and inside their areas, and the establishment of cooperative stores which handle all major commercial transactions and all imports and exports. To affect control within their society they established the system of travel and purchase permits described above. To regulate external trade, they established customs checkpoints, decreed stiff penalties for anyone caught trading illegally, set up boundaries past which it was forbidden for anyone to travel, relocated the population away from foreign communities and forbade all trade with VC and NVA military units. Having thus disrupted usual commercial patterns, the KK sought to set up a system of cooperative trading stores. These were first established in Kampong Trach District in 1972 and are the only authorized agents with whom outsiders can deal. To insure their success, all residents of KK areas were also forced to buy and sell certain restricted items only at these stores. It is important to note that the cooperative stores were not intended to replace the traditional local market in each village and hamlet, but rather serve as a sub-district trading post at which goods from the outside can be bought and goods for the outside sold. In Kampong Trach District, for example, there are four cooperative stores to serve the six widely-separated villages. There is also a co-op at
Chong Khsach Hamlet, in Kaoh Thom District, which serves all of southern Kandal Province, and several in nearby Svay Rieng Province. The cooperatives sell local surplus agricultural products such as rice, corn, green beans, peppercorns, and potatoes as well as pigs, chickens and cattle to buyers from SVN. In return they import kerosene, medicine, black cloth, farm implements and salt for local sale, and also gasoline and medicine for military use.

These stores bring the KK a large profit, all of which is retained by the government. The cooperative store buys all local produce at an extremely low price (usually less than one-half the price paid at unrestricted border markets) and then sells at a high rate to merchants from SVN. It is able to do this because, in both cases, it enjoys a monopolistic position. To protect this position, the KK forbid the sale of certain products except in limited amounts at local markets for consumption within areas they control. Faced with a surplus and no other place to sell, local farmers are forced to deal with the co-ops.

Having cut off trade between residents of its areas and SVN, the KK worked to re-establish these trade lines, making sure, however, that they now go through their cooperative stores rather than private commercial middlemen. For instance, it is reported that the co-op in southern Kandal Province does a three million piaster a week trade with a consortium of businessmen from Chau Doc Province. The KK export cattle, sugar cane, vegetables, pigs and fruit and in return receive payment in the form of drafts on Phnom Penh banks and/or medicine, kerosene, salt, farm tools, and cotton and nylon cloth. Another example of this effort to establish exclusive trade occurred in late December 1973 when the KK in Takeo Province sent a message to GVN authorities in Chau Doc proposing a mutual easing of border restrictions and establishment of trading relations between the two areas. The KK said they would sell cattle, pigs, chickens and certain other products to SVN if they could buy rice and other goods from merchants there.

In Kampot Province, the KK have a cooperative representative at the Lok Market (VS 390545) to insure a steady and exclusive flow of imported goods from Ha Tien District of Kien Giang Province. There are also
indications that the KK in nearby Svay Rieng and Prey Veng Provinces are establishing trading arrangements through their cooperative stores with merchants in SVN. One exception to this is in Kampot Province where, in an apparent effort to continue to use established business connections in the Chinese community in GKR areas, the KK have allowed establishment of a Chinese cooperative controlled but not run by the Kampong Trach District government.

Relocation of Population: As stated above, one way in which the KK tried to insure the success of their effort to cutoff all trade with outside elements was through a program of population relocation and the creation of uninhabited buffer zones around areas they controlled. By moving people away from the SVN border, Vietnamese settlements in Cambodia, and VC/NVA military units, the KK theorized that in addition to restricting trade they would be: cutting down the possibility of unwanted political contacts; cutting off a major source of VC/NVA supplies (part of their effort to drive the VC/NVA from Cambodia); increasing their own control over the population; and securing a large tax base for their exclusive use. This program was carried out extensively in Kampot, Takeo and Kandal Provinces, beginning as early as 1972 in Kampong Trach District of Kampot. Initial relocations were small and it was not until mid-1973 that the program was carried out on a large scale. This was preceded by a purge of low-level cadre. In parts of Takeo and Kampot, the KK brought in a large number of new cadre to implement this program, having lost faith in many older cadre whom they considered to be either pro-NVA or not tough enough to carry it out. This large-scale relocation process, which lasted from July to December 1973, was bitterly opposed by most people and caused many to flee to SVN.

The resettlement program had extremely harsh results. In many cases, families were forced to abandon all their possessions, except for basic necessities. Others reportedly committed suicide rather than face the loss of all their worldly possessions. Stories carried back by those people who had survived earlier relocations told of people dying en route and forced labor after arrival. As a result, even in areas of Kampong Trach where villagers could take all their possessions with them, fear grew and village officials fled rather than carry out the directives from higher headquarters. To counter this, district level cadre and soldiers
were sent to enforce these movement orders. They also resorted to terror. As mentioned above, in Banteay Meas District of Kampot, anyone protesting these policies was arrested, taken away, and never seen again. Despite this, people living near the border still fled and in Russei Srok Village alone about 70% of the population escaped. Others living farther away could not flee and had to comply. By November most of these movements were completed and a de-populated buffer zone had been established along the SVN border stretching from the Gulf of Thailand to the Bassac River. ConGen officers who flew along the border inside SVN were able to observe deserted villages, empty roads, abandoned rice fields and abandoned towns such as Kampong Trach. The only exceptions were the areas still controlled by the VC/NVA, which remain inhabited. Based on this and other evidence available, it is believed that the KK have relocated at least 20,000 people in the Kampong Trach-Banteay Meas area alone and several thousand others in Kandal.

Conditions at these new locations are reportedly not good. People who have escaped state that they are crowded, dirty places where people suffer from a lack of food and a great deal of sickness. All land is organized and worked in common on the basis of the 12 family inter-groups and even though production has been increased through the use of fertilizer and other scientific methods, people are reportedly unhappy because they are forced to work constantly and because they do not have land of their own.

4. Popular Reaction to KK Communization Program

The most ostensible manifestation of popular reaction to the KK communization efforts has been the large number of people who have fled KK control, even with the knowledge that they would be shot if caught. Since the beginning of 1973 approximately 28,000 people have entered SVN or are living along the SVN border just inside Cambodia. Another 20,000 to 25,000 are estimated to have fled to GKR-held provincial towns. Interviews reveal that many were not fleeing the fighting between the KK and VC or NVA but rather harsh KK policies. Others, of course, did initially flee the fighting but now refuse to leave the camps and return to KK areas.
even though the fighting had ended. The policy which seems to have caused the largest number of people to seek refuge was the forced relocation. However, other KK policies have caused an adverse reaction as well. In Svay Rieng Province, an estimated 10,000-15,000 people reportedly fled KK control in June because they objected to:

- restrictions on trade and movement,
- the policy of forced sales at low prices in cooperative stores,
- being forbidden to practice the Buddhist religion,
- denial of freedom of speech and the right to voice support for Prince Sihanouk,
- children and youth being forced to join KK youth groups and serve in the army.

These same grievances are also felt by most people who still remain in KK areas. There is also much unhappiness over the communization of land.

Fear and terror was also a motive causing people to flee KK rule. Refugees in Chau Doc Province who fled from Kandal, Takeo, and Kampot Provinces said the climate of fear became so oppressive that even in their own homes they dared not utter a complaint against the government lest someone outside hear and report them to the authorities who would come and take them away to be tortured or killed. Others complained that life had become too hard under the KK and much of the fun was gone.

Another source of adverse reaction was the KK anti-Sihanouk campaign. In Svay Rieng Province the KK were vitriolic in their criticism of the Prince, whom they called a "leech on the revolution". This precipitated spontaneous popular demonstrations. To make amends, the KK had to send in a second propaganda team explaining that it was all a mistake. Not all reactions to the KK have been adverse, however. As described above, youths who had received intensive political training came back as almost fanatic adherents to the KK. Additionally, many poorer people supported the earlier KK programs such as land redistribution because they received benefits under it. However, in early 1973 when the KK entered the new harsh phase of their campaign in which all rules were strictly enforced and unpopular programs carried out, with stiff penalties for non-compliance, almost all popular feeling turned against them.
It now appears that this campaign has produced some severe reactions. Most recently, there have been indications of opposition to KK policies resulting in fighting and minor rebellion. As was cited earlier, KR and KK forces clashed in Kampot Province during the last quarter of 1973 over control of the rice harvest and the KK policy of relocating villages. Other sources state that a strong reaction to the KK's attack on religion has developed in Svay Rieng. It is not known, however, whether this has precipitated any physical violence.
6. Summary

In conclusion, it would seem appropriate to reiterate the main findings of this study. To us, the following are the most important developments which have taken place in this border area of Cambodia:

a. The United National Liberation Front has been disassembled at the province level and below and the Khmer Krahom have clearly emerged as the predominate faction;

b. Prince Sihanouk has no power and authority within the Khmer Krahom or the province and district governments. He does, however, retain a great popularity with a majority of the citizenry;

c. The Khmer Krahom have begun the establishment of a totalitarian-like state which has already significantly altered the degree of personal freedom allowed, the practice of religion and nature of the economic and agricultural system; and
ATTACHMENT B

KHMER COMMUNIST STAFFING PATTERN:
REGION*

- CHAIRMAN
  - DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
  - POLITICAL COMISSAR
    - CULTURAL COMMITTEE
    - ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
    - LOGISTICS COMMITTEE
    - PROPAGANDA/YOUTH
    - SOCIAL WELFARE
    - PUBLIC HEALTH
    - TRAINING CENTER
      - MILITARY COMMANDER
        - DEPUTY
          - CHIEF OF STAFF
PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KIMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
PROVINCE*

CHAIRMAN

SECRETARY
Province Open Office

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

POLITICAL COMISSAR

ECONOMIC COMM.
SOC. WEL/ PUB HEALTH
SECURITY
YOUTH
MONKS' ASSOC
CULTURAL COMM.

MILITARY AFFAIRS
PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KHMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
DISTRICT*

CHAIRMAN
(Elected)

DEPUTY FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(Snon Kana Yobai Yothea Srok)

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN **
(Elected)

Post Office  Logistics  Social Welfare  Training/Propaganda  Economic Production  Youth  Women's Affairs  Police

Co-Op

Troop Commander
District Patrol

Secretariat
(2 Men)

District Open Office

Women's Affairs

Industry
PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KHMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
VILLAGE

CHAIRMAN (Elected)

Secretary

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

SOC. WELFARE HEALTH

ECeOMY

CULTURE

SECURITY POLICE (2-Men)

MEN'S ASSN

WOMEN'S ASSN

YOUTH ASSN

GIRL'S ASSN

FARMERS' ASSN

VILLAGE MILITIA

HAMLET CHIEFS
ATTACHMENT F

PARTY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT
(KHMER COMMUNIST)
STAFFING PATTERN:
HAMLET*

CHAIRMAN

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN**

COMMITTEEMAN**

HAMLET MILITIA
KHYMER COMMUNIST STAFFING PATTERN:
INTER-FAMILY GROUPS AND PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATIONS*

CHAIRMAN
(May be Appointed or Elected)

DEPUTY

COMMITTEEMAN
November 7, 1975

The Honorable Thomas E. Morgan  
2183 Rayburn Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Sir:

In the Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding "Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Request" there is a document listed which is not included in the published report.

The document is referred to on p. 495 of the report and is entitled, "The Khmer Kahom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia. I would very much like to obtain a copy of this report, perhaps a member of your staff could xerox one and mail it to me. If there is any expense involved I would be pleased to reimburse your committee by return mail.

Sincerely,

Louis A. Fanning, Ph.D.  
76 Birch Ave.  
Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735

Department of State  
Director, Freedom Information  
Staff TA/F01  
Room SA35 Dept State  
Wash, DC 20520